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1     Introduction   
In the contemporary international law, the issue of child soldiering is addressed in three 
major categories, namely the international humanitarian law, the international human rights 
law and the international criminal law. Despite the existence of such rules children are 
being recruited and used by state and non-state actors, chiefly, in on going and recent 
internal armed conflicts around the globe1. Moreover, the number of children recruited and 
used in armed conflicts has increased over the years. Some attribute the increased 
availability of automatic weapons, M16 or AK-47 easy to disassemble, assault rifle, has 
made the use of child soldiers more noticeable now.2 Poverty, according to some, causes 
the conflicts and suggests that in the end any change for such children in the developing 
world depends on poverty reduction and settling conflicts caused by poverty.3   
The violation of the international law on child soldiering is one of the challenges that the 
international community is encountering. It has been suggested that success to end the 
practice will depend on “…continued monitoring ….an uncompromising commitment by 
local, national, and international authorities to hold perpetrators accountable”4.  
The issue of the thesis is what can be done about the violations of the international law of 
child soldiering by states and non-state actors? In other words the thesis addresses the issue 
that comes up once the international law on child soldiering is breached. How can those 
who breached their duty be made accountable for their violation under international law? In 
answering the question the thesis explores into the Security Council resolutions and the 
International Law Commission’s draft articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereinafter the Draft Articles). This issue is addressed 
                                                 
1
. http://humanrightswatch.org/campaigns/crp/facts.htm ,outlines ‘facts about child soldiers’ visited on 
January 8, 2008  
2
 . Madubuike-Ekwe (2005) p.2 
3
 . Ibid 
4
. Becker (winter 2005) p.18   
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notwithstanding the effort to end the practice by dealing with the underlying causes. The 
issue also takes cognizance of the advocacy for the universal application of the 18 years 
age limit. On the other hand the issue is addressed given the enforcement of individual 
criminal responsibility under the Special Court for Sierra Leone (hereinafter SCSL) and 
now the International Criminal Court (hereinafter ICC). In addressing this issue, the thesis 
intends to forward the focus on enforcement of the rule that now arguably forms part the 
customary norm. But the thesis discussion of the customary status of the prohibition of the 
conscripting and enlisting of children below 15 years of age into armed forces and using 
them to participate actively in hostilities will be limited to the 2004 decision of the SCSL 
and writings of scholars.     
The thesis focuses on the accountability of states and non-state actors that in breach of 
international law recruit and use children below the age of 15 years. Accordingly, 
accountability for the purpose of the thesis is either to indicate individual criminal 
responsibility of natural persons or the responsibility of the state or the non-state actors for 
breaching the international obligation on child soldiering. In addition, the phrase non-state 
actor is used to refer to armed groups such as insurgent, paramilitary, rebel, irregular 
forces, liberation fighters or other armed groups of similar nature. The thesis also uses the 
word recruitment alternatively and interchangeably with the phrase “conscription or 
enlistment”. Recruitment is taken as being inclusive of the conscription and enlistment.       
The structure of the thesis is five-fold. Firstly, the thesis outlines the extent of the practice 
of child soldiering in armed conflicts. It gives the picture of how children are used, why 
recruiters target children and on the other hand why children themselves volunteer. 
Secondly, the thesis discusses the enforcement mechanisms under the different treaty laws 
and the specific provisions regulating child soldiering.  
Thirdly, the thesis examines the accountability of natural persons by looking into the 2004 
preliminary decision of the SCSL on child recruitment, customary nature of the crime, in 
the light of its contribution to invoke accountability of state and non-state actors as such. 
Forthly, the thesis argues for and analyzes how states and non-state actors could be held 
accountable, for breaching the international law of child soldiering, under the Security 
 3 
Council resolutions and the draft articles. The thesis finally concludes by suggesting for 
more targeted action by the Security Council and for the application of the draft articles. 
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2      Extent of child soldiering  
Reported by the Human Right Watch, there are 300,000 child soldiers, constituting children 
under 18 and even as young as 8 years old.5 Despite the growing concern and effort, by 
non-governmental organizations and inter-governmental organizations, to raise the age 
limit to 18 years and setting legal rules on different treaty bodies children in developing 
countries are continuingly being exposed to the modern warfare6.   
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter CRC) under Article 1 defines a 
child to mean “…every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law 
applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.” But it is only to those below 15 years 
that the said convention extends its protection from recruitment and use in armed conflict.7 
Child soldiering is not new phenomenon to the international community. History shows 
that the practice dates back to the Middle Ages when children in thousands went off from 
Europe to martyr themselves in the “Children’s Crusade”8. Whereas the “Baby Brigade” of 
the Tamil Tigers forms part of the 1990’s child soldiering that the world has experienced.9 
Yet age limits for recruitment into armed groups, however, varying between the age of 15 
and 18, is put in place by international instruments.  
Children below the age of 15 years old are recruited in armed groups and participate in 
different armed conflicts, often forcibly and armed group commanders in some cases were 
themselves recruited at a very young age.10 These children are used for a variety of tasks, 
once they become part of the armed force.   
                                                 
5
.  Supra note, 1  
6
. Geske (2005) p. 123  
7
 . CRC, Art 38 , see part 3.2 of the thesis  
8
.  Webster (2007), p. 229, see also supra note 6, p.112 
9
. Briggs (2005) p. 86  
10
 . Ibid, p. 42 children as young as eight in the guerilla groups in Colombia like the FARC, p.86 children as 
young as 11 in the Tamil Tigers of Sir Lanka  
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2.1    Using children in armed conflicts  
Children fought in the battles for instance, in Sir Lanka and Northern Uganda. In Sir Lanka 
“Many Tamil children have been recruited or conscripted into the LTTE (Tamil Tigers) 
cadres…” and thus drawn into combat where as those Children that Joseph Kony took 
“…became foot soldiers in his personal insurgency…”11 Children serve as ordinary foot 
soldiers, sent to front lines or into the mine fields ahead of adult troops.12 In the Rwanda 
genocide children participation was planned and it was the case that children below 14 
years had participated in some form in the genocide.13 Children were used as informants in 
identifying members of particular targeted groups in the genocide and they have engaged in 
looting and as servants or guards of the Hutu army.14  
Children are trained for suicide bombing mission.  The Tamil Tigers in Sir Lanka is known 
for using children for suicide bomb mission, particularly girls.15 In Sir Lanka child soldiers 
make mines and are made to manufacture bombs.16  Children used by the guerillas were 
used to place bombs.17  
The Lord Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda uses children as shields. In addition 
Joseph Kony the LRA leader is known for sending children into battle unarmed. These 
children are made to move towards an objective. Then commanders force them to march in 
single file and to essentially act as shields. Whereas when they are made to fight they will 
get killed if they drop their weapons, take cover, or retreat.18  
Girls in armed groups are also subjected to sexual abuse, exploitation and some are used 
for sexual service as forced ‘wives’.19 Boys in Afghanistan war “…were thought to have 
been used as sexual partners by adult commanders”.20  
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 . Supra note 9, p. 83 ,p.108 
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 . Supra note 6, p.111 
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 . Supra note 9, p. 20  
14
 . Ibid , p.18  
15
 . Supra note 2, p.3 
16
 . Supra note 9, p. 89  
17
 . Ibid , P. 42  
18
 . Ibid , p.122  
19
 . Supra note 6, p.111 
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Children taken by the LRA, “…became porters who carried supplies or farming equipment; 
they were sold to neighboring Sudan for arms and supplies; or they were murdered as an 
example ,to toughen up other abductees.”21  Children used by the FARC in Colombia spy, 
carry messages and guard kidnapped victims.22  
Children are either forced to join armed groups or it may also be the case that they 
volunteered to join. The following parts will show the different findings that suggest 
different reasons as to why children are targeted or why they choose to join armed groups.  
 
2.2    Involuntary recruitment   
Involuntary recruitment is used to refer the different ways by which children are forced to 
join in armed groups. Joseph Kony, since the LRA started to fight in 1986, has abducted up 
to ten thousand girls and boys from boarding schools, church and isolated farms.23 It was 
typical of these abductions that the children’s families and neighbors are murdered or the 
children’s themselves were made to do the killings so that they become hardened to 
violence.24 On the other hand “as the tide of civil war takes over people’s lives and homes, 
young people may be forcibly conscripted and abducted into armed groups.”25 Then they 
become greatly vulnerable for abduction. There are explanations as to why children are 
being targeted by the armed groups and forced to join.   
Some of the explanation given include26 firstly, children are found unaccompanied on the 
streets driven by poverty and violence. Secondly, children become the next obvious choice 
when there is shortage of adult soldiers. Thirdly, children’s obedience and malleability 
makes them desirable. On the other hand the lack of documents certifying their age and the 
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 . Supra note 9, p. 155 
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 . Ibid , p. 108 -109 
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 . Ibid , p.42 
23
 . Ibid , p. 108 and p.115 
24
 . Supra note 2, p.2  
25
 . Berry (2001) p.93 
26
 . Supra note 6, p.113, see also Madubuike-Ekwe (2005), p.2 for more on the second reason  
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lack of serious legal ramifications which armed groups face facilitated such recruitment in 
Sierra Leone.27       
 
2.3   Voluntary recruitment 
The growing number of non–international armed conflicts, the increase in the easy 
availability of small arms and the fact that such wars tend to turn the civilian communities 
into battle grounds all contribute to the reasons why children choose to join armed 
groups.28  The issue of how voluntary is their choice is debated.   
They become soldiers”…in light of the influences and pressures upon them, which they 
experience as part of their day-to-day environment.”29 Economic hardship, promises of 
payment and education are the driving force for the children to join.30 Thus decide to join 
armed groups to run away from the poverty they live in.  
Girls in Sri Lanka join armed groups of the Tamil Tigers to protect themselves against rape 
and sexual assault by government forces.31 Children volunteer when they loss what 
constitutes their security and guarantee for their future, like land or cattle.32 Seeking 
vengeance for the lost or killed family members or parents, children make the choice to 
join armed groups. 33 Some children also join simply because they think that fighting is 
heroic. Some are attracted by the power and status of carrying weapons.34  
Lack of schools or the irregularities in schooling, which are most of the time affected by 
armed conflicts, makes the children to be without any kind of activity that occupies them 
thus they join armed groups. For instance studies on children in Colombia showed ‘social 
                                                 
27
 . Supra note 2, p.2 
28
 . Supra note 25, p.93 
29
 . Ibid 
30
 . Supra note 6, p.113  
31
 . Supra note 9, p.83 and p. 91  
32
 . Supra note 25, p. 100  
33
 . Supra note 9, p.57  
34
 . Ibid, p. 157 
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exclusion, mistreatment, and lack of educational opportunities and jobs in rural and 
marginal areas…’are the reasons why children join armed groups.35   
Thus, one has always to ask if their choice to join is really voluntary. Some studies show 
that children who made the choice to join armed groups are more likely to return, even if 
demobilized, if the reason that they choose to join has not changed significantly as 
compared to children who were abducted and physically forced to join an armed group.36 
Except for the few cases where children really join or volunteer for the sole reason to fight 
with a full understanding about the political and ideological reasons behind the group, it is 
frequently the case that the distinction between voluntary and forced recruitment is not 
clear-cut.37   
The different reasons behind their volunteering show that they join because of 
circumstances beyond their control, lack of alternatives or lack of other options or because 
of misleading information or false promises of pay or education.38 As such, any ‘choice’ 
these children may have as to whether or not to enlist is illusory.”39 
Many argue that in order to end the use of child soldiers in armed conflicts, all these factors 
must be taken into account and solution must be designed to deal with the root causes. 
Some studies suggest that children should be provided with education in secured schools, 
poverty should be eradicated and the issue underlying the conflict should be resolved.40 
Other studies suggest that global monitoring of arms trade and effective conflict prevention 
will end the practice of child soldiering.41 Whereas other studies emphasis much effort 
should be made to continually demobilize and integrate child soldiers.42 Hence, how does 
the international law regulate child soldiering and makes violators accountable?      
  
                                                 
35
 . Ibid , p43  
36
 . Brett (2004) p.105 
37
 . Ibid , p.112 
38
 . Ibid 
39
 . Supra note 2, p.2  
40
 . Supra note 36, p. 3 
41
.  Supra note 25, p.99 
42
 . Supra note 36, p.2 
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3    Enforcing provisions governing child soldiering under the different treaty   
Laws  
Treaty law binds states that have ratified it whereas customary international law binds all, 
both state and non-state actors. When it comes to the regulation and enforcement of child 
soldiering on the one hand it concerns respect to the law of war and on the other hand 
protection of the rights of children. Especially the prohibition and regulation of those under 
15’s is much about public order as it is about the protection of children’s rights.43 This part 
will examine the regulation and the enforcement of child soldiering in the international 
humanitarian law, international human rights law, regional instrument and international 
criminal law.  
    
3.1    International humanitarian law   
Under the four Geneva Conventions there is no specific provision that regulates child 
soldiering. Thus the Additional Protocols are the first international humanitarian law 
instruments that explicitly stipulated rules on child soldiers. But Art 51 of the fourth 
convention can be linked to prohibition of child soldiering.  
 
3.1.1     Art 51 of the GCIV 
The 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of War 
(hereinafter GCIV) according to Art 4(1) provides protection for persons who find 
themselves “…in the hands of a party to the conflict or occupying power of which they are 
not nationals.” The first paragraph of Art 51 of the GCIV stipulates “the occupying power 
may not compel protected persons to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces. No pressure or 
propaganda which aims at securing voluntary enlistment is permitted.” The commentary on 
Art 51 distinguishes the services that are prohibited from civilian work. Under this 
                                                 
43
 . Happold (2000) p.30   
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paragraph the “occupying power is forbidden to force protected persons to serve in its 
armed or auxiliary forces”. In addition to the prohibition of enlistment all forms of pressure 
or propaganda to secure voluntary enlistment is also prohibited. No derogation from such 
rule is permitted.44 
This provision does not regulate the situation in which a state forces its own nationals to 
serve in its armed forces. According to Art 2 of GCIV, the convention does not apply to 
non-states actors. Second Art 51 does not regulate voluntary enlistment in the absence of 
pressure or propaganda. It can be said that the article is not stipulated to address child 
soldiering alone, since the provision refers to protected persons in general. If the child 
soldiers are not among the protected persons then Art 51 does not apply to them.   
 
3.1.2   Art 77(2) of API 
The 1977 protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (hereinafter API), governs 
situation of civilians in international armed conflicts. According to Art 1(1) and (4) of API 
the protocol applies to states and to national liberation movements fighting colonial 
domination and alien occupation and a racist regime in the exercise of the right to self-
determination. The particular provision dealing with child soldiering, Art 77 (2) of API, 
stipulates that   
The parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that children who have not 
attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in particular, they 
shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons 
who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of eighteen years 
the parties to the conflict shall endeavor to give priority to those who are oldest.   
This provision is the first to address explicitly the issue of child soldiering. It is a 
development to the GCIV and other rules of international law such as the declaration on the 
rights of the child “which at the time was developing into a convention under UN”45.  The 
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 . http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebPrint/380-600058-COM?OpenDocument  (Visited January 29,2008)  
45
 . Ibid, parag 3176 & 3177  
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provision applies to all children who are in the territory of the party states involved in the 
conflict.  
The phrase “…all feasible measures…” which was adopted instead of “all necessary 
measures” makes the obligation under the former weak.46 The fact that the article offers 
much lower standard will allow a state party considerable freedom to evade the general 
prohibition.47  On the other hand the phrase “…direct part in hostilities…” needs 
interpretation. What does “direct part in hostilities” mean? The fact that there is no 
definition of the term under the treaty body of international humanitarian law contributes to 
the problem of applying Art 77(2). Is it only delivering of violence or fighting that is 
regarded as direct part in hostilities? If yes, it leads to the argument that activities like 
gathering and transmission of information is not prohibited under the rule.48 Qualifying the 
nature of participation in this manner fosters ambiguity and invites subjective interpretation 
by states.”49  
The phrase “direct participation in hostilities” is used not only under Art 77(2) of the API 
but also in many other provisions of international humanitarian law. Thus there is direct 
participation in hostilities by child soldiers and by civilians in general. As to what 
constitutes direct participation in hostilities is controversial. What is not controversial is 
that carrying out an attack is a direct participation in hostilities. But whether preparing or 
returning from an attack is direct participation in hostilities is still controversial.50 It is 
argued that “…the behavior of civilians must constitute a direct and immediate military 
threat to the adversary” for it to be regarded as a direct participation in hostilities.51 The 
critics on such an interpretation enlarge the notion to include “…acts aimed at protecting 
personnel, infrastructure or material.”52 Even much broader interpretation of the term 
                                                 
46
 . Supra note 43, p.35 
47
 . Supra note 2, p. 4  
48
 . Supra note 43, p.36 
49
 . Supra note 2, p.4  
50
 . http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/participation-hostilities-ihl-311205  
51
 . Ibid  
52
 . Ibid  
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suggest that the direct participation in hostilities “rest on appreciation of the value added 
brought to the war effort by civilian post as compared to a purely military activity.”53 It is 
also debated if direct part in hostilities includes logistical support activities and intelligence 
or guarding activities.54     
International humanitarian law intends to protect civilians as much as possible. Civilian 
loss their status and the protection afforded to them for the time that they take direct part in 
hostilities.55 That is why direct participation in hostilities by civilians must be interpreted 
narrow enough to give more protection to civilians. Thus, the narrower the interpretations 
of the term “direct participation in hostilities” the more protection that civilians will be 
entitled to. On the other hand taking Art 77(2) the interpretation of the term “direct part” if 
broad enough might provide greater the protection to children. An interpretation that 
includes other than engaging in violence, will contribute in order to spare children from 
armed conflicts and at the same time for the order of warfare. Taking Art 77(2) states have 
a duty to take all feasible measure to make sure that children below 15 years do not take 
direct part. If applying narrow interpretation then it may mean what is prohibited is only 
carrying out attack or fighting. Therefore in order to protect children and to make sure that 
order of warfare is respected the interpretation of “direct part in hostility” for the purpose 
of Art 77(2) be enlarged.   
 
3.1.3   Art 4(3) of APII 
The 1977 protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (hereinafter APII) regulates 
the issue of child soldiering in internal armed conflicts. Art 4 of the protocol stipulates the 
fundamental guarantees that civilians are entitled in internal armed conflict. Sub article 3(c) 
of the said provision provides that “children who have not attained the age of fifteen years 
shall neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in 
hostilities”. This paragraph “…determines the lower age limit of 15 years for recruitment 
                                                 
53
 .  Ibid  
54
 .  Ibid  
55
 .  Art 51 in general and sub article 3 of the said provision of the API 
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into armed forces”.56 The restriction is broader than that under Art 77(2) API. The 
obligation under Art 4(3) (c) is absolute in prohibiting that children should not take part at 
all in hostilities.57 Meaning the provision is not limited to direct participation. “The 
language of the protocol ascribes responsibility to those who allow children to participate 
rather than to children themselves”.58 Thus it is the duty of states and non-state actors to 
make sure that they do not recruit children below 15 years of age.   
The above provisions of the international humanitarian law on child soldiering are now 
customary international law. This was firmly held by the 2004 SCSL decision on the 
preliminary motion on recruitment of child soldiers. The court held that prior to 1996 there 
is a customary international law that prohibited the recruitment of child soldiers below the 
age of 15 years old. The court considered whether the two elements of customary 
international law are present to conclude that the rule has crystallized as customary 
international law. According to the Art 38(1) (b) of the 1945 statute of the international 
court of justice “custom as evidence of general practice accepted as law” is one of the 
sources that the SCSL had to look into. The court looked into the state practice and opinio 
juris, the two elements of custom.  
The court has demonstrated that state practice is widespread by taking the wide ratification 
of the treaties. It showed that the GCIV, API and APII are widely ratified treaties. 185 
states are parties to the GC prior to 1996 and 133 states have ratified APII before 1995.59 
The court also looked into the 2004 UNICEF amicus brief which shows the list of states 
that have legislation indicating the minimum age.60 From the brief the SCSL concluded that 
it shows that states have for a long time prohibited recruitment of below 15 years olds. As 
for opinio juris the court held that the state practice shows opinio juris. The state practice is 
                                                 
56
 . Supra note 44, parag 4549   
57
 . Supra note 43, p.39  
58
 . Supra note 2, p.5 
59
 . Infra note 114, paragraph 18, p.13 
60
 . Ibid , paragraph 18, p.13 
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the result of opinio juris and the court did not go into detail to show the existence of opinio 
juris.61  
In the contemporary international law the identification of customary international law has 
become more relaxed.  The modern identification of the crystallization of customary law 
“…relies principally on loosely defined opinio juris and/or inference from the widespread 
ratification of treaties …” making it more flexible and open to the relatively rapid 
acceptance of new norms.62 This flexible approach is very useful when important values 
are involved, as it is the case with the prohibition on child soldiering. As for the SCSL the 
court if it had not used such flexible approach then it would not have been able to exercise 
its jurisdiction on indictments on child soldering. The Value that is protected by the 
prohibition should be given much emphasis than sticking to the traditional form of 
identification of customary status of a given rule. 
  
3.1.4    Enforcing the provisions   
What are the enforcement mechanisms available under the international humanitarian law? 
Depending on the particular provision at issue, there are different mechanisms to ensure 
observance of international humanitarian law. Among the mechanisms are reprisal, penal 
and disciplinary measures, compensation, protecting powers and their substitutes, 
international fact finding, the International Committee of the Red Cross (hereinafter ICRC) 
and diplomatic activities.63 From this mechanisms only three of them, ICRC, penal 
measures and compensation, will be examined to address the enforcement of the provisions 
on child soldiering. Forestalling breaches and ensuring compliance with the provisions on 
child soldiering would be the most appropriate way of enforcing the provisions. But, once 
the rules are breached then the penal enforcement and compensation can be resorted to. The 
following paragraphs will show the issues underlying enforcement.   
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 .  Ibid , paragraph 17, p.13  
62
 .  Meron (2005) p.1 
63
 .  The handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict (1995) p.525  
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ICRC is an organ that is dedicated to promoting the faithful application of the law of war. It 
monitors the observance of the Geneva Conventions and the AP’s.64 ICRC has no express 
supervisory authority but it monitors observance.65 Its “…reports and findings are strictly 
confidential and are only forwarded to the party concerned” and it is only in some cases 
that it makes a public statement urging compliance with the rules of the Geneva 
Convention and the Additional Protocols.66 With the level of confidentiality expected of the 
ICRC, if the state concerned is not complying with the ICRC suggestions there can’t be 
much of enforcement.   
Penal repression is the most appropriate and fitting method of ensuring compliance with 
international treaties.67 Similarly provisions on child soldiering may best be enforced 
through penal repression. Under the treaty body of the international humanitarian law grave 
breaches call for penal measures. “The consequences of a grave breach are always of a 
penal nature…” and every state has a duty to investigate and prosecute accused person for 
committing or ordering in violation of the rules.68 Except what is provided under Art 147 of 
GCIV, violation of Art 77(2) of API and Art 4(3) of APII do not form part of the grave 
breaches of the international humanitarian law. One of the grave breaches enshrined under 
Art 147 of GCIV includes “compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile 
power”. Art 51 may be related to “…the regulation of children’s participation in 
hostilities…however, although the article refers to all protected persons, children included, 
due to its general nature it cannot be seen as specifically dealing with their protection”.69 Its 
application is limited to situation of occupied territory or to the nationals who are in the 
hands of the adversary. Its enforcement will be restricted to situations were there is power 
that is enlisting children protected under the said provision.  
 
                                                 
64
 . Ibid , p.547 
65
 . Ibid , p.548 
66
 . Cassese (2005), p.429 
67
 . Ibid , p.426 
68
 . Supra note 63, p.528 
69
 . Supra note 43, p.30 
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But penal repression is not limited to the grave breaches since under customary 
international law it is well established that other serious violation of international 
humanitarian law provisions entail criminal responsibility. Child soldiering provisions 
considered above do not form part of grave breaches of the international humanitarian law, 
thus whether the violation of the rules has been criminalized has to be established. The 
crime of child recruitment was considered as a serious violation of the law of war by the 
SCSL (discussed in part 4). When the court was determining whether the crime existed it 
used the test that International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has set 
in Prosecutor v. Tadic case.70 As per the test four requirements must be met for a violation 
of the law of war to entail penal measure. The requirements are71international humanitarian 
law rule must be violated, the rule at issue must be customary in nature, violation must be 
“serious” (meaning a breach must protect important value and that it involves grave 
consequence for the victim) and, violation of the rule must entail individual criminal 
responsibility. Another possibility to determine if the breach entailed criminal 
responsibility may be whether the breach is termed as a war crime by the statute of an 
international tribunal.72 Breach of such a rule may become a war crime that falls under the 
jurisdiction of the international tribunal. This may be the case even if the breach has never 
been brought before a national or international tribunal.73 Therefore the penal repression of 
the violation of the international humanitarian law is not limited to the grave breaches.        
Compensation is the other enforcement mechanism of the rules on international 
humanitarian law. Art 91 of API stipulates that compensation can be claimed following the 
breach of the rules under GCs and API. Art 91 of the API states that  
               A party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the conventions or of this protocol 
[API] shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all 
acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.  
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This provision “…corresponds with the principle, as developed both in state practice and in 
international decisions that a breach of international law caused by an individual state will 
serve as grounds for its responsibility.”74 However in practice compensation for each 
individual violation has never been enforced.75 But the article is intended to refer to 
liability that the state owes to another state and not to its own nationals. Second sentence of 
Art 91 evolved from the system of international law of state responsibility.76 The state is 
held accountable for acts of persons in an official capacity and may be demanded to pay 
compensation.  
    
3.2   International human rights law  
Under international human rights treaties states are the duty bearers and they establish 
monitoring mechanisms through which the obligations are enforced. Such preference to 
monitoring mechanisms is due to “the need to strike a compromise between state 
sovereignty and the requirement that states comply with international standards on human 
rights…”77 Child soldiering in international human rights treaties is regulated under the 
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 2000 Optional protocol to the CRC on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict (hereinafter the Protocol) and the 1999 ILO- 
convention no.182 concerning the prohibition and immediate action for the elimination of 
the worst forms of child labor (hereinafter ILO convention).  
 
3.2.1    Art 38 of the CRC 
Art 38 of CRC deals with the rights of children in armed conflict. Sub article 2 of the said 
provision stipulates “states parties shall take all feasible measure to ensure that persons 
who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities.” This 
provides “…a global agreement that persons under 15 should not bear the arms, perpetrate 
the violence, nor wear the uniform of any combative group in any form of political conflict 
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in the world”78 The prohibition under the article is again limited to direct participation in 
hostilities. Since CRC is meant for children protection it would have been more protective 
and all encompassing if the provision prohibited all kind of participation in hostilities. 
States are left to determine the measure that they deem feasible to make sure that children 
below 15 years of age do not take a direct part in hostilities. Art 38 (3) further stipulates 
“states parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the age of 
fifteen years into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons who have attained 
the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of eighteen years, states parties 
shall endeavor to give priority to those who are oldest.” Generally Art 38 indicates an 
absolute prohibition of the recruitment of children below 15 years of age into armed forces. 
One of the limitations of the CRC is the fact that it only limits the conduct of states while 
leaving out not-state actors.79 
The universal acceptance and ratification of the CRC in general and Art 38 in particular 
provide compelling evidence that the conventional norm on child recruitment have 
crystallized into customary international law.80 And the fact that there is no single 
reservation to lower the obligation under Art 38 emphasizes that the norm has become 
customary international law.81          
Accordingly Art 4 of the convention provides that states have duty to implement Art 38 of 
the CRC by “…undertaking all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other 
measures…” Art 43 of the CRC established the committee on the rights of the child to 
monitor compliance by states of the obligations under CRC. And it is in its second session, 
in 1992, that the committee proposed for further restriction on the children’s participation 
in armed conflicts then made a proposal for an optional protocol.82 Since then the 
committee has been sized with preparing the protocol until it finally came into force in 
2002.   
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3.2.2     CRC Optional Protocol      
Art 1 of the protocol provides states duty to “…take all feasible measure to ensure that 
members of their armed forces who have not attained the age of 18 years do not take a 
direct part in hostilities”. Even if the provision puts 18 years as a minimum age it does not 
prohibit all forms of participation. The protocol also regulated forced or involuntary 
recruitment under Art 2. It imposes a duty on states that they shall make sure that 
“…persons who have not attained the age of 18 years are not compulsorily recruited into 
their armed forces.” Thus minimum age is established for conscription and direct 
participation in combat. But as per Art 3(1) it only raised the minimum age of voluntary 
recruitment certainly to be above 15 and left it for state parties to decide on the exact age 
limit. Failure to make the minimum age for voluntary recruitment at the age of 18 has 
become one of the major criticisms on the protocol.83  
The protocol did regulate armed groups of non-state actors. Under Art 4 of the protocol 
non-state groups are absolutely prohibited from recruiting and using children below the age 
of 18 in hostilities under any circumstance. Art 4 (2) imposes a duty on the state party to 
take all feasible measure to prevent recruitment in violation of Art 4(1) by non-state actors. 
The measure that the provision stipulates includes legislative measure to prohibit and 
criminalize the practice by non-state actors. So it is the state that is primarily expected to 
take measure to ensure compliance by non–state actors in its territory. But “states would 
not appear to have many means to prevent insurgent groups from recruiting and using child 
soldiers other than prosecuting and punishing [based on Art 4(2)] rebels who fall into their 
hands if they have participated in the recruitment or use of child soldiers, but the situation 
might be different with regard to armed groups allied to the state’s government.”84 But still 
the protocol has taken an important step in regulating armed groups belonging to non-state 
actors.  
 
3.2.3    ILO convention no.182  
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The International Labor Organization, in convention no.182 regarded child soldiering as 
one of the worst forms of child labor. It basically regulated involuntary recruitment of 
children into armed forces. The ILO Convention among other things aims to end forced 
recruitment of children in armed groups. Thus, Art 3(a) puts that ‘forced or compulsory 
recruitment of children under the age of 18 years for use in armed conflicts is one of the 
worst forms of child labor. “This is the only ILO standard specifically addressing the 
question of military recruitment of children”.85 Recommendation no 190, concerning 
convention No.182, encourages state parties to make the recruitment in violation of the 
convention a criminal offense under their national law.86    
 
3.3    Regional instrument  
The only regional binding instrument that regulated child soldiering is the African Charter 
on the Right and welfare of the Child which came into force in 1999. The charter under Art 
22(2) provides that “State parties to the present charter shall take all necessary measures to 
ensure that no child shall take a direct part in hostilities and refrain in particular, from 
recruiting any child.” The charter becomes the first instrument that established a ‘straight 
18’ rule banning all recruitment along with direct participation in hostilities.87 In addition 
the fact that the charter opted for “all necessary steps” as opposed to “all feasible measure” 
makes it stronger in light of obligation that it imposes on parties to the charter.88 But here 
also the article only refers to direct participation and state parties are the only duty bearers 
under the charter. For state party that has ratified the charter “…the question of 
distinguishing between voluntary recruitment and forced or compulsory recruitment does 
not arise for under -18s…”89 Yet, it is mostly in armed conflict in African that much of 
today’s violation of the international law of child soldiering persist. Though its 
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implementation by the signatories can be criticized, the charter has taken a strong position 
against this social pandemic.90      
 
3.4    International criminal law 
The statute of the international criminal court enshrined the treaty provision concerning the 
crime of child soldiering. The statute defined the mere prohibition under the additional 
protocols and the CRC as a crime.91 This part of the thesis will examine what the statute 
established as a crime that entails individual criminal responsibility.    
Art 8 of the ICC statute stipulates war crimes into two categories. The first category 
contains the “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols. 
The second category of war crimes contains “other serious violations of the laws and 
customs of war”. Both categories of war crimes under Art 8 cover war crimes that are 
committed in international and non-international armed conflicts. It is in the second 
category of war crimes that the ICC statute enshrined the crime concerning child 
soldiering.  
Art 8 (2) (b) (xxvi) of the ICC statute provides “conscripting or enlisting children under the 
age of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to participate actively in 
hostilities” is a war crime. This is the penal provision for international armed conflicts. 
Whereas, Art 8(2) (e) (vii) of the ICC statute provides the penal provision for non-
international armed conflicts and it reads “conscripting or enlisting children under the age 
of fifteen years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in 
hostilities". The two provisions are basically the same.  The only difference appears in the 
expression of the armed groups that are to be involved in international armed conflict and 
non-international armed conflict. Individuals who in breach of the above provisions 
recruited or used child soldiers whether in international or internal armed conflicts will be 
held criminally responsible. Thus both the mental and material element of the crime must 
be present for any person to be criminally responsible.  
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Concerning the material element of the crime each term of the provisions must be 
examined. First, what is the required degree of participation to be a war crime? In drawing 
up the provisions there was a debate among the delegates as to the required degree of 
participation in the hostilities that will lead to war crime.92 The terms ‘using’ and 
‘participating’ refers, first and for most, to active participation in combat and equally to 
other linked military activities. The preparatory committee’s list includes scouting, spying, 
sabotage and the use of children as decoys, couriers or at military checkpoints and other 
direct support functions like acting as bearers to take supplies to the front line, or activities 
at the front line itself.93 But it does not include activities like ‘food deliveries to an airbase 
or the use of domestic staff in an officer’s married accommodation’.94  
Second, what is meant by the phrase “taking direct part in hostilities”? Unlike some other 
treaty provisions considered above, the phrase ‘taking direct part in hostility’ was 
considered a phrase that would not allow wider interpretation as opposed to the phrase 
‘active participation’ that can embrace support functions also.95 In any way the degree to 
which the use or participation of below 15’s constitutes a war crime is for the judges to 
decide.96  
Third, what is meant by conscripting or enlisting? The use of the phrase conscription or 
enlisting as opposed to recruitment under the above two provisions of the statute was 
intentional. Conscription indicates “compulsory entry into the armed forces” and enlistment 
indicates “the generally voluntary act of joining armed forces by enrolment, typically on 
the “list” of a military body, or by engagement, indicating membership and incorporation in 
the forces.”97 In other words “the use of the phrase ‘conscripting or enlisting’ suggests that 
both actively recruiting children and passively allowing them to sign up are banned.”98 
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Besides it makes it clear that the crime intends to cover active efforts by officers to draw 
children into their ranks.99 Such a phrase catches “…the moment that a person joined the 
armed forces, whether voluntarily or by some form of coercion.”100 In other words what is 
criminalized under the statute includes the formal entry of persons below 15 into armed 
forces and a physical incorporation in armed forces or “schools” that an armed force 
operates and that primarily train those groups of persons for the conduct of armed 
warfare.101  In addition consent given by the person below 15 is not a defense to enlist or 
conscript and authorizing it is also prohibited.102       
The choice of the word ‘person’ as opposed to ‘children’ is also deliberate to limit the 
applicability of the provisions to those below 15 years. It was intended to avoid possible 
clash with the definition of the child and for the purpose of applicability of the provisions 
on child recruitment under ICC statute any person under the age of 15 years is a child.103 
In general the relevant elements of the crime entailing individual criminal responsibility are 
three. One, it must be shown that “the perpetrator conscripted or enlisted one or more 
persons into the national armed forces [or in case of non-international armed conflict the 
armed force or group] or used one or more persons to participate actively in hostilities”, 
two, “such person or persons were under the age of 15 years”, three, “the perpetrator knew 
or should have known that such person or persons were under the age of 15 years”.104  
Thus as to the mental element of the crime it is the duty of the prosecutor to prove that the 
accused “knew or should have known that such person or persons were under the age of 15 
years”. This strict requirement of mental element was intended to guarantee protection of 
children.105   
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As a result of the ICC statute enactment, now it is a war crime to conscript or enlist persons 
below 15 years of age or using them to participate actively in hostilities. Declaring and 
stipulating this egregious practice as a war crime may have its own contribution to end the 
sense of impunity felt for long when recruiting and using children in hostilities.  
These provisions of the ICC statute set the bottom line for the international community as 
to what is unacceptable and intolerable concerning recruitment and use of child soldiers. 
The provisions show there is no room and tolerance for those who violate the standard age 
limit put under the ICC statute as it is now violation of the core international crimes. 
Moreover the individual criminal responsibility does not affect the accountability of the 
state and non-state actors on whose behalf the individual acted.  
Art 25(4) of the ICC statute provides that “No provision in this statute relating to individual 
criminal responsibility shall affect the responsibility of states under international law.” This 
provision confirms the parallel validity of the draft articles.106 Hence, violations that lead to 
individual criminal responsibility could similarly pose the issue of accountability of state or 
non-state actors as such. Sub Art 2 of the same provision states that a natural person will be 
made individually responsible for committing a crime that falls within the court’s 
jurisdiction. The crime of conscripting or enlisting persons under 15 into armed forces or 
using them to participate actively in hostilities has brought about the first prosecution 
involving the situation in Democratic Republic of Congo (hereinafter DRC).    
                                                                                                     
3.4.1   The DRC situation  
The DRC situation is one of the four “situations and cases” that the ICC is currently 
dealing with.107 The DRC conflict was known to have involved child soldiers in large 
numbers. Based on the estimate made in the year 2000 between 10,000 and 20,000 under 
15’s were serving as soldiers within the various forces fighting in the conflict.108 During the 
conflict children have been abducted or forcibly recruited for military service by non-state 
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actors involved.109 “In total, it is estimated that more than 30,000 child soldiers serve 
among the ranks of the various belligerents in the entire DRC…” forming 40 to 60 per cent 
of the soldiers who were fighting the war.110 The ICC prosecutor Mr. Luis Moreno-
Ocampo is investigating and prosecuting cases against four individuals from DRC and the 
case Prosecutor V. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is one of them, which involve war crime 
charges against the accused Lubanga.111 The accused was the commander-in-chief of the 
armed military wing and a founder of the Union des patriots Congolais (UPC), which was 
established in 2000.112 The prosecutor charge against the accused involves three war 
crimes, one, enlisting children under the age of 15 years, two, conscripting children under 
the age of 15 years and three using children under the age of 15 to participate actively in 
hostilities.113 This is the only war crimes charge against the accused and the case is at trial 
stage. The court’s deliberation and decision on the Lubanga case will contribute to the 
development of the jurisprudence and case law on the prohibition and the crime of child 
soldiering. As to how the court deals with the provisions of ICC statute discussed above 
remains to be seen.   
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4       Accountability of Natural Persons     
States and non-state actors are entities that can only function and operate through natural 
persons. Thus it is a natural person that will be held criminally responsible under 
international criminal law. As per Art 25(1) of the ICC statute, the court is established to 
have jurisdiction over natural persons. Similarly SCSL was established to try the most 
responsible ones for the crimes committed in Sierra Leone, including crime of child 
recruitment.  
The SCSL is known for being the first international tribunal that decided on the issue of the 
crime of child soldiering. This part of the thesis will examine the 2004 decision of the 
court, how the customary nature of the crime was established.      
 
4.1    Crime of child recruitment – The Norman Case114   
The Norman case is significant because it answered the question that there is a crime of 
child recruitment under customary international law by November 1996 entailing 
individual criminal responsibility. The Sierra Leone conflict was known largely for 
extensive recruitment and use of child soldiers115 by all state or non-state armed forces 
involved. In this decade-long Sierra Leone civil war more than 10,000 children have been 
used in the three major armed forces called the Revolutionary United Front, the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council and the Civil Defence Forces.116  Based on the agreement 
between the UN and the government of Sierra Leone the SCSL was established in January 
2002. It was established to “prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for 
serious violation of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in 
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the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996”.117 The Special court for the first 
time indicted natural persons for the crime of recruiting child soldiers.118 Based on the 
defendant’s motion the court decided that there is a crime of child recruitment.   
The preliminary motion was raised by the defendant Sam Hinga Norman, who was a leader 
of the Civil Defence Force a pro-government militia group119. He argued that the SCSL 
lacks jurisdiction for the crime under Art 4(c) of the statute120. The said provision of the 
statute of the SCSL is found under the category of “other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law”. According to Art 4(c) the court can prosecute persons bearing the 
greatest responsibility for “conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into 
armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities.”121 
The court by 3:1 majority decided that there is a crime of conscripting and enlisting of 
children below 15 years of age in armed forces or using them to participate actively in 
hostilities under customary international law by November 1996. To determine the 
question raised by the defendant the court discussed international conventions and 
customary law.  
The court when discussing international conventions pointed that it was not disputed that 
international humanitarian law is violated by the recruitment of children. Thus, the court 
highlighted the key provisions under the GCIV, API, APII and CRC i.e. Art 51, Art77, Art 
4(3) and Art 38 respectively.  The court then, discussed and held that the prohibition of 
child recruitment has crystallized as customary international law.  
To reach at this conclusion, the court looked into state practice and opinio juris, the two 
elements of custom. The court has demonstrated that state practice is widespread. It showed 
that the GCIV, API and APII are widely ratified treaties. At the same time its huge 
                                                 
117
 . Art 1 of the agreement between the United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone on the 
establishment of a special court for Sierra Leone , available at http://www.sc-sl.org/documents.html 
118
 . Supra note 116, p.1.  
119
 . Ibid 
120
 . Supra note 114, p.3  
121
 . Art 4(c) of the Statute of the special court for Sierra Leone , available at  http://www.sc-
sl.org/documents.html  
 28 
ratification indicates that CRC has become customary. Particularly the fact that there is no 
reservation on Art 38 shows that the rule has universal acceptance. As for opinio juris the 
court held that the state practice shows opinio juris. The decision quoted that ‘an articulated 
sense of obligation, without implementing usage, is nothing more than rhetoric. 
Conversely, state practice, without opinio juris, is just habit.’122 Therefore all the parties in 
the Sierra Leone conflict are bound by the international humanitarian law prohibition of 
child recruitment.123    
Then the court considered the main question, whether the prohibition on child recruitment 
entailed individual criminal responsibility. The court showed that the principle nullum 
crimen sine lege is not violated. To reach at the decision, the court pointed out that the 
emphases should be on the underlying conduct rather than on the specific description of the 
crime in substantive criminal law. The court showed that the violation of the rule on child 
recruitment is serious. This is because, according to APII, the rule is part of the 
fundamental guarantee. Such inclusion as a fundamental guarantee indicates that the 
international community agreed that the rule is a benchmark or a minimum standard in 
armed conflict. In addition the court referred to the Security Council condemnation of the 
practice as inhumane and abhorrent. Thus the breach of the rule on child recruitment is a 
breach of important value. Moreover the breach of the rule on child soldiers has a grave 
consequence for the victims. The court verified this by looking into numerous reports of the 
different human rights organizations that it has the most atrocious consequence for the 
children.124 Then, does the breach entail individual criminal responsibility? 
The court considered other instances of serious violation that entailed individual criminal 
responsibility. Those are the fundamental prohibition under common Article 3 of the GCs, 
the outline of fundamental guarantees under Art 4 of the APII, the ICTY, and International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Akayesu determinations and the Security Council 
explicit recognition that serious violation entails individual criminal responsibility.125     
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The court has also noted that the existence of a provision and state practice showing the 
intention to criminalize can be taken as a factor to establishing that the rule entails 
individual criminal responsibility. Crimes against international law are obviously 
committed by men and the provisions will only be enforced if individuals are punished. 
Thus the court concluded that a norm need not be expressly stated in an international 
convention for it to crystallize as a crime under customary international rule. If that is so 
required then what will be the meaning of customary international rule.126  
The dissenting opinion differed that the defendant should not be prosecuted for the crime of 
enlisting since the prohibition did not entail individual criminal responsibility by 1996. He 
considered recruitment, in the particular case at hand, to refer to enlistment charges alone. 
Hence according to the dissenting opinion the defendant should not be prosecuted for an 
offence of enlistment since it has never been prosecuted and has not evolved into 
customary international law. He argues that the crime of enlisting only came to be 
prosecuted after its enactment as a war crime by the mid 2002 when the ICC statute came 
into force. He dissent that by the end of 1996 no offence has evolved or emerged into 
customary international law which permitted individual criminal responsibility of enlisting 
i.e. accepting for military service of under 15’s.127 
Justice Robertson argument is based on the matter which the majority has not dealt with. 
Thus, looking at it from the point of view of the value that the prohibition is protecting, the 
manner of recruitment does not really matter. Since by the prohibition of recruitment (both 
conscription and enlistment) of children below 15 years of age children will be protected 
and public order will be maintained. For the court to be able to exercise this important 
jurisdiction, then the approach taken by the majority in determining the customary status of 
the crime of child recruitment appears plausible. Customary international law binds 
individuals, states, and non-state actors. The existence of customary rule is very important 
for the international law on child soldiering where there exists different treaty regulation. 
The customary rule, without prejudice to the treaty duties, will serve as a minimum 
standard that binds all. 
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5       Accountability of states and non-state actors 
While it is natural person that will be held criminally responsible for committing a crime, 
the state or the non-state actor on whose behalf the individual acted might be held 
accountable for its failure to comply with its obligation under international law of child 
soldiering. Criminal sentences on individuals alone are unlikely to prevent breaches or 
ensure compliance. In other words states and non-state actors as such should be accounted 
for violating their international obligations. States are bound by treaty obligations that they 
have ratified, thus they could be made accountable for breaching their obligation under a 
given treaty. The issue of accountability of non-state actors is much more difficult since 
most of the treaty obligation does not bind them. Moreover it is non-state actors that are 
often implicated for recruiting child soldiers. International rules are agreed upon to address 
states with the result that non-state actors are not bound and the beneficiaries of the rule, 
i.e. children victimized by the practice, have no enforceable rights.128 But it was shown that 
the CRC optional protocol has managed to extend the duty under the protocol to non-state 
actors. And the same is true with the ICC statute which provided penal provision for both 
state and non-state actors. It is also shown that the customary rule on child soldiers binds 
both state and non-state actors. This part of the thesis will discuss and argue for the ways 
and possibilities to make state and non-state actors accountable. The Security Council 
resolutions and the draft articles could be the basis to argue for the accountability of states 
or non state actors as such.   
  
5.1    Accountability under the Security Council Resolutions   
For almost a decade now the Security Council has been sized with the issue of children and 
armed conflict in general and the issue of child soldiering in particular. Generally the 
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resolutions deal with the impact of armed conflict on children and protection of children in 
times of war. The resolutions have also taken the issue of child soldiering significantly 
especially in the resolutions that came later on.  
 
5.1.1    Chapter VII application  
The Security Council is the body at the international level that has the capacity to 
determine and take action under chapter VII of the UN Charter. This chapter provides the 
enforcement power of the Security Council. According to Art 39 the SC “…shall determine 
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace…and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measure shall be taken in accordance with Article 41 and 
42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” The involvement of the UN 
Security Council on the issue of child soldiering is a big step. This is because the SC 
considers the matter as a threat to the international peace and security and requiring action, 
short use of force, under Art 41 of the UN Charter. Art 41 of the UN charter reads “the 
Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be 
employed to give effect to its decisions, and may call upon the members of the United 
Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.” Art 39 and 41 are the basis for 
the SC resolutions on child soldiering. The Security Council since 1999 has passed six 
resolutions under the subject children and armed conflict. The following sub-sections will 
examine each of the resolutions in the light of the measure taken by the SC on states and 
non-state actors who in breach of international law recruit and use child soldiers.  
       
5.1.2   Resolution 1261(1999) 
Resolution 1261(1999)129, the first resolution on the subject, generally condemned the 
recruiting and using of children in armed conflict. The resolution under paragraph 2 
provides that the SC “strongly condemns…recruitment and use of children in armed 
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conflict in violation of international law. Similarly the SC extended its condemnation to 
“…attack on…places that usually have a significant presence of children such as schools 
and hospitals…” The said paragraph thus“…calls on all parties concerned to put an end to 
such practice.” This paragraph shows that the SC has recognized that the problem exists 
and that it constitutes a threat to the peace. But the resolution has not made any reference to 
specific situation or to specific state or non-state actors. The condemnation is thus broad 
and not targeted on a specific circumstance. As a measure following its condemnation the 
SC called for an end to the practice broadly to those who recruit and use child soldiers. 
This may be taken as a springboard for the process of accountability of states and non-state 
actors. To elaborate this by an example for the LRA attacking school to abduct children 
was a common practice in the process of recruiting child soldiers. In this way it has 
abducted up to ten thousand girls and boys from boarding schools, churches and isolated 
farms.130 The same resolution under paragraph 18 the SC reaffirmed its “…readiness to 
consider appropriate responses whenever buildings or sites which usually have a significant 
presence of children are specifically targeted in situations of armed conflicts ,in violation of 
international law”. This may be used to address situations when states or non-state actors 
attack such venues to recruit and use children into their armed forces.      
 
5.1.3   Resolution 1314 (2000) 
Resolution 1314(2000)131 is the second resolution that the SC has passed on children and 
armed conflict but there was no particular condemnation or measure taken on those who in 
breach of international law recruit and use child soldiers. The resolution under paragraph 
16(c) urged regional and subsequent organizations and arrangement to undertake initiative 
to curb the cross-border recruitment and abduction of children. There is no particular 
situation that was referred under the paragraph. This gives an indication that the SC is 
determined to make sure that measures are taken to control the practice. Thus it is not so 
much about making the states and non-state actors involved accountable but restraining the 
practice with the help of organizations and arrangements.          
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5.1.4   Resolution 1379 (2001) 
Resolution 1379(2001)132, the third resolution, is relatively significant in the light of 
establishing accountability of state and non-state actors for their practice in child 
soldiering. The resolution demanded the Secretary-General to report the list of states and 
non-state actors who in violation of the rules applicable to them recruit and use child 
soldiers. Specifically paragraph 16 of the resolution requests the Secretary-General to 
report “…a list of parties to armed conflict that recruit or use children in violation of the 
international obligations applicable to them…” This may be taken as one step ahead of just 
words of condemnation. But the SC request shows that it wanted to limit itself to situations 
that are already on its agenda. Then the request adds that the report to include, other armed 
conflict situations that in the Secretary-General’s opinion should be brought to the attention 
of the SC as per Art 99 of the UN charter. The said article stipulates that “The Secretary-
General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion 
may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.” Such a request leads the 
report to be selective and not to cover all armed conflicts existing around the world.  
In its report to the SC the Secretary –General133 annexed the list of violators of the norms 
and standards. The list included three states and twenty non-state actors and it only presents 
five of the conflict situations that the SC was sized with. The conflict situations include 
Somalia, Liberia, DRC, Burundi and Afghanistan. From among the five situations it is in 
Liberia, DRC and Burundi that the state is implicated. All the other twenty non-state actors 
listed are found in five of the counties on the list of the Secretary-General report.  
The report also has included those other conflict situations that are not on the SC agenda134. 
They include five non–state actors in Colombia, paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, 
insurgency groups in Republic of Chechnya, Armed groups and the national armed group 
                                                 
132
 . Resolution 1379(2001) 20 November 2001 S/RES/1379 (2001) 
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm 
133
 . Secretary –General report to the security council s/2002/1299 November 26,2002 can be found at 
http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/reports.html  
134
 . Supra note 133, p.8 and 9  
 34 
in Myanmar, non-state actor (Maoist) in Nepal, several armed groups in Philippines, Non-
state actors in Sudan, the LRA in Northern Uganda and Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka.  This 
report was considered by the Security Council135 on its next resolution on children and 
armed conflict. The resolution has gone one step further by requesting for the monitoring 
and reporting on the situations on the list.     
 
5.1.5   Resolution 1460(2003) 
Resolution 1460(2003)136 under paragraph 5 made reference to the list on the Secretary–
General’s report. The paragraph states that the SC “notes with concern… and calls on the 
parties identified on this list [the three states and the twenty non-state actors] to provide 
information on steps they have taken to halt their recruitment or use of children in armed 
conflict in violation on the international obligation applicable to them…” In addition the 
SC, under paragraph 6, makes a threat that if the parties on the list have made insufficient 
progress “…its intention to consider taking appropriate steps to further address this issue, 
in accordance with the charter of the United Nations and its resolution 1379(2001)…”  
Thus, if the parties listed do not end their practice or are doing insufficient to end the 
practice, then further measures are to be followed. In the end of the resolution, under 
paragraph 16(a) and (c), the SC requested the Secretary–General to look into the progress 
made by those on the list and in addition to include “specific proposals on ways to ensure 
monitoring or reporting in a more effective and efficient way within the existing United 
Nations system on the application of the international norms and standards for the 
protection of children in situations of armed conflict in all its various aspects;” The 
monitoring and reporting that the SC is referring to will be limited in application to the 
situations on the list.  
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The Secretary-General report to the SC on November 2003137, basically made its 
assessment of the progress made by the parties on the list on the November 2002 report. 
The aim of the assessment of the parties’ progress is towards ending recruitment or use of 
children in armed conflict. As a basis for its assessment it looked into if parties have 
engaged in dialogue with the Secretary-General in the field, if the parties have made 
commitments to stop recruiting or using children, if the parties have ended the recruitment 
or the use of child soldiers, if the parties have developed action plans to demobilize child 
soldiers and if the parties have began demobilizing the child soldiers.138 It is evident that 
the aim and the basis of assessment intended to end the practice, rather than making the 
states and non-state actors accountable for their violation. But this is expected since 
measure under chapter VII does come as a last resort when all other possibilities seem to 
have failed. In addition the report also put forward the possible monitoring and reporting 
mechanism for the parties who are on the list.  
The “era of application” that the Secretary–General had in mind was monitoring. The 
proposal to monitor was indorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1460. The SC 
requested for the “specific proposal on monitoring and reporting.”139  
What the report proposed was to have a ‘monitoring and reporting mechanism on the 
conduct of parties to conflict”. In such monitoring operation among others, recruiting and 
use of child soldiers, egregious violation against children140, should receive priority 
attention.141 It proposed a monitoring network comprising the Security Council among 
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other UN systems.142 The information that the SC gets from the network of monitoring 
“should serve as a trigger for action”143. Action that the Secretary-General has proposed 
includes calling for compliance, condemning violations and applying targeted measures.144 
As to what such targeted measures might include may be cross referred with the Secretary-
General’s recommendation. The recommendation provides for “…the imposition of travel 
restriction on leaders and their exclusion from any governance structure and amnesty 
provision, a ban on export or supply of small arms, a ban on military assistance, and 
restriction on the flow of financial resources to the parties concerned”145.  
Concrete measure by the SC is to be taken when violation of recruiting or using children 
persists. The aim of any concrete measure would be to end the impunity for states and non-
state actors whose have persistently violated their obligation.146 Thus designing a 
monitoring mechanism that must lead to action (targeted measure or concrete measure) is 
the core of the “era of application”.147 One of the recommendations is to update the list of 
parties who are recruiting and using of children annually and “…include all situations 
where such practice persists”.148 Continued updating on the list of parties significantly 
contributes to identify and make states and non-state actors accountable for their violation. 
The year 2003 marks the beginning of the “naming and shaming”149 of states and non-state 
actors known to have recruited and used children in violation of their international 
obligation.      
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5.1.6    Resolution 1539(2004)  
Resolution 1539(2004)150 considered the November 10, 2003 Secretary-General’s report.  
Paragraph one of resolution 1539 began by putting its strong condemnation on the 
recruitment and use of child soldiers in violation of international obligation applicable to 
each of the state and non-state actors implicated. In paragraph two the SC requested the 
Secretary-General “…to devise urgently and preferably within three months, an action plan 
for a systematic and comprehensive monitoring and reporting mechanism …” taking 
account of the proposal in its 2003 report. Here again the Security Council seems to be 
shying away from taking concrete action on persistent violators. 
This resolution makes direct reference for the parties on the list without off course 
mentioning the names of state and non-state actors on the list. The SC also demanded plans 
to halt the recruitment and use of child soldiers. Under paragraph 5 the Security Council 
notes with concern the continued practice by the parties on the list. Then is called upon the 
parties “…to prepare within three months concrete time-bound action plans to halt 
recruitment and use of children in violation of the international obligations applicable to 
them…” Here again the SC continued to make threats on the parties who despite the 
resolutions and the follow up by the Secretary-General continued to violate their obligation. 
The SC expressed its intention “…to consider imposing targeted and graduated measures, 
through country-specific resolutions, such as, inter alia, a ban on the export or supply of 
small arms and light weapons and of other military equipment and on military assistance, 
against these parties if they refuse to enter into dialogue, fail to develop action plan or fail 
to meet the commitments included in their action plan, bearing in mind the Secretary-
General’s report”. Such a threat is limited to those parties whose situation is already on the 
agenda of the SC. As for the other situations of armed conflict that are mentioned in the 
Secretary-General report, under paragraph 6 of the resolution 1539, the SC expressed its 
concern and calls on all parties to halt the practice and expressed its intention to consider 
taking appropriate steps to further address this issue and take action in accordance with the 
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UN charter and its resolutions. This shows the readiness of the SC to take actions on yet 
other conflict situations which are not on its agenda. In the end while demanding the next 
report from the Secretary-General ,under paragraph 15, the SC demanded that the report 
should include information on compliance and progress in halting the practice of child 
soldiering , both of the parties on the on SC agenda and those of other situations that the 
report had included. In addition the SC demanded for information on the progress made 
with regard to the action plan “…that calls for a systemic and comprehensive monitoring 
and reporting mechanism;” that the SC demanded from the Secretary-General under 
paragraph 2 of the same resolution.    
 
5.1.7    Resolution 1612 (2005) 
The 2005 Secretary-General report to the SC recommended targeted and concrete measures 
where insufficient or no progress has been made by the parties on the list.151 It made the 
same suggestion of proposed measures in previous report. The SC reluctance in taking 
targeted measure, on the parties on the list152, can further be seen in resolution 1612(2005). 
The Security Council expressed that it is seriously concerned with the lack of progress in 
developing and implementing, concrete and time-bound, action plan to halt the practice that 
was demanded in resolution 1539(2004) from every party on the list. In addition the SC 
continued its threat by reaffirming its intention to take country specific measure.153 The 
Report indicated that “the practice of listing offending parties…represents a landmark 
development for monitoring and reporting”.154 The report among others focuses on, 
recruitment or using of child soldiers as the gravest violations especially egregious 
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violation that demand monitoring.155 Thus the mechanism must monitor the conduct of all 
parties to conflict state and non-state actors.156 Security Council is the key and by far the 
most important “destination for action” and since it has primary responsibility for peace 
and security has special responsibility for protection of children and ensuring 
compliance.157  
Resolution 1612 have become finally successful in creating the monitoring and reporting 
mechanism and established a working group that will review the reports. This is a positive 
aspect of the resolution. But it is disappointing that the SC while acknowledging the gravity 
of the problem refuses to take action. The resolution adds another series of paper threat and 
is not going to deter the parties from recruiting and using child soldiers.158 
Such monitoring and reporting may serve as the best way to follow up on the progress 
made by the parties on the list in ending their use of child soldiers. In addition it can be a 
tool to identify who is not making any effort to end the practice. Thus it may serve as the 
basis for taking targeted action on those who despite the monitoring continue to violate 
their obligation under international law. Targeted action on specific situations might have 
been much better effect to enforce the rules on child soldiering. The resolutions as 
examined above aim at ending the practice. Looking at it from the point of view of making 
the states and non-state actors accountable the Security Council resolutions may serve as 
the basis for taking action. This may be for the simple reason that the SC has taken up the 
matter as constituting a threat to international peace and security. But the fact that the 
Security Council wants to limit itself to situations that are on its agenda may make the 
process less effective. This is because the process will not cover all violations by state and 
non-state actors around the globe. It is also not difficult to notice that threat to take targeted 
action is the trend in the resolutions. But the Security Council did not go any step further 
than threatening to take specific and targeted action on persistent violators.  
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To sum up violation of the rules on child soldiering has triggered Security Council’s 
involvement. The resolutions in general have been clear in condemning the violation by 
both state and non-state actors. Moreover the resolutions have managed to name and shame 
the violators and establish monitoring and reporting with the aim of ending the practice.  
               
5.2    Accountability under the draft articles  
The argument that states and non-state actors as such could be accounted for violating the 
minimum standard on child soldiering will be the subject matter of discussion under the 
present part of the thesis. It examines and argues for the application of chapter three of the 
draft articles on state responsibility. The prohibition of the conscription and enlistment of 
children below 15 years of age into armed forces or using them to participate actively in 
hostilities is the minimum standard on the international law of child soldiering. This 
minimum standard forms the basis of the argument that states or non-state actors who acted 
in breach can be made accountable under the draft articles. The following parts will seek to 
identify if, how and when the draft articles be applied.    
     
5.2.1   The Notion  
To argue for the accountability of states and non-state actors under the draft articles 
looking at the idea of state responsibility in the context of international law of child 
soldering is helpful. To say that there is an international wrongful act of a state two 
cumulative requirements must be present. Those are when the conduct (act or omission) is 
attributed to a state under international law and that the conduct constitutes a breach of an 
international obligation of the state.159  Basically attribution of conduct to a state concerns 
that the conduct be either that of conduct of an organ of a state or that of persons or entities 
exercising the elements of government authority or that of organs placed at the disposal of 
a state by another state or the like.160 Under the second requirement the conduct must 
constitute a breach of an international obligation. According to Art 12 of the draft articles 
there exist a breach of an international obligation “…when an act of that state is not in 
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conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or 
character.” The breach or the violation of the rule on child soldiering is thus an 
internationally wrongful act. Therefore according to Art 1 of the draft articles violation of 
the rule on child soldiering entails the international responsibility of that state.      
States and non-state actors alike have an absolute obligation not to violate the prohibition 
of the conscription and enlistment of children below 15 years of age into armed forces or 
using them to participate actively in hostilities. Violation of this norm becomes an 
international wrongful act.  
The breach of this norm now is a serious violation of the international humanitarian law 
and has become a war crime under the ICC statute. Besides it also constitutes a norm under 
international human rights law. And under the Security Council resolutions beach of the 
norm is regarded as serious and egregious in nature triggering action by the SC. The norm 
protects and preserves an important value of the international community and it protects 
international public order. Thus does the violation of the norm constitute a serious breach 
of obligation under the peremptory norms of general international law (under chapter III of 
the draft articles)? Then, what is the consequence of the breach of the norm under the draft 
articles? To address the first question the requirement under Article 40 of the draft article 
must be fulfilled. First, does the obligation derive from a peremptory norm of general 
international law? Second, is the breach serious in nature?  
 
5.2.2   Character of the obligation breached  
The character of the obligation breached can be examined from the value protected by the 
norm and arguably its peremptory character.  
In terms of the value protected by the norm, the character of the obligation breached can be 
examined from different angles. It can be examined from the norm’s status as a war crime 
or as a serious violation of international humanitarian law, as a universal standard under the 
CRC, as a customary international law and as a norm the breach of which poses a threat to 
the international peace and security. Such character of the norm may be used in support of 
the argument that the norm is accepted and recognized by the international community as a 
norm from which no derogation is permitted.   
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For the application of chapter III of the draft articles the character of the obligation 
breached must be concerning an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general 
international law.161  
 
5.2.3 The value protected  
The prohibition of the conscription and enlistment of children below 15 years of age into 
armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities intends to protect important 
value of the international community. The kind of obligation referred under Art 40 of the 
draft articles, arises from substantive rules of conduct and the breach of which has come to 
be seen as intolerable, because of the threat it presents to the most basic human values.162 
Similarly the breach of the norm on child soldiering has also come to be intolerable as the 
violation escalated both by state and non-state actors in armed conflicts around the world.  
The breach of the rule at issue is regarded as war crime or a serious violation of 
international humanitarian law. Under the preamble of the ICC statute war crime 
particularly the norm at issue is regarded as the most serious crime of concern to the 
international community as a whole. According to Cassese such crimes that are regarded as 
serious violations entail responsibility of the state under chapter III of the draft articles.163 
Besides, the breach of the humanitarian norm under Art 77(2) of the API is regarded as 
inhumane164 while Art 4(3) of the APII provides the norm as one of the fundamental 
guarantees of the protocol. These fundamental guarantees are among the basic rule of 
humanitarian law. Basic rules of humanitarian law regarded as “intransgressible” in 
character justifies the treatment of such rules as being peremptory.165    
The rule on child soldiering under the CRC is a universally accepted standard. CRC is the 
most widely ratified human rights convention. CRC protects the human rights of children 
and the norm at issue protects children from the effects of warfare. Such universal 
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acceptance of the norm indicates that the international community as a whole has 
acknowledged that the prohibition preserves important value of the international 
community. It can be argued that the prohibition in the end aims to protect the fundamental 
human rights of children i.e. their right to life. When the prohibition is violated it is likely 
that the life of the children will be endangered and in the end their right to life deprived.   
It is also important to take the SCSL standing concerning the character of the obligation at 
issue and the impact of the violation on the victims. The court has noted that the violation 
is egregious and abhorrent and the prohibition protects important values.   
This egregious and intolerable violation has triggered the involvement of the Security 
Council regarding it as a breach which poses a threat to the international peace and 
security. Such gross violation has in the past two decades has threatened the most basic 
human value that the international community agreed to protect. 
All these show that the prohibition does exist to protect and preserve important value. Thus 
those state and non-state actors who breach their obligation under the prohibition must be 
made accountable.  
 
5.2.4  Art 53 of the VCLT  
In order to be able to able to assess the character of the obligation and the applicability of 
chapter III of the draft articles it is necessary to examine the peremptory norm under Art 53 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).  
Art 53 of the VCLT provides that “… a peremptory norm of general international law is a 
norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a 
norm from which no derogation is permitted and can be modified only by a subsequent 
norm of general international law having the same character”. Three things must be 
examined from the provision. First the norm is a norm of general international law. The 
second is acceptance and recognition of the norm by the international community of states 
as a whole. Third is the acceptance and recognition that there can be no derogation from the 
norm.    
It has long been established and argued that there are few norms that are regarded as 
peremptory norms. The obvious list presented is aggression, slavery, genocide, racial 
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discrimination and apartheid. These peremptory norms have been established based on the 
practice of both national and international courts and based on the fact that the norms have 
been prohibited in widely ratified international treaties and conventions admitting of no 
exception.166 But being very restrictive and limiting what can be regarded as peremptory 
norms to those lists above will be to the detriment of the protection of important values that 
are immerging in the contemporary international law. The approach that is taken in the 
following paragraph to determine the character of the norm on child soldiering is 
progressive. The reason for following progressive approach is intended to safeguard the 
value that the norm protects so that the obligation is owed by state and non-state actors to 
international community of states. The norm on child soldiering protects overriding interest 
of the international community and that is what peremptory norms intend to protect.         
Moreover peremptory norms have increasingly become important in the process of 
determining the permissible limit for action or omission of states, non-state actors and 
individuals in different areas.167 Thus to determine if a norm is peremptory “enquiring into 
the content of every norm on its merits in light of some predetermined category of 
identifying a norm’s peremptory character”168 is crucial. Besides, the fact the norm has or 
lacks states and courts practice can not be an exclusive factor in identifying peremptory 
norms.169 Therefore it is important to make an assessment of the merits of the norm on 
child soldiering based on the three basis of examination setout above.  
Is the norm a norm of general international law? What is meant by general international 
law? Norms of general international law are norms that create obligation for at least a great 
majority of states or other subjects of international law.170 For a norm to be part of general 
international law at least a great majority of states accept the obligation under the norm.171 
Taking the norm under Art 38 of the CRC the international community of states except 
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USA and Somalia have accepted the obligation and no reservation is entered in accepting 
the obligation under the provision. CRC is regarded as a convention that has universal 
ratification. This is indicative of the fact that the international community accepts the duty 
under the norm. The same holds true with the wide ratification of the API and APII. Great 
majority of states have accepted the obligation under the norm. This also answers in part 
the second question raised under art 53 of VCLT.   
Is the norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states? Looking 
into Art 53 of VCLT, it provides that the norm must be agreed up on by the international 
community of states as a whole. Here it could be argued that what is emphasizing is not so 
much on the necessity of agreement by the whole international community that a certain 
norm is peremptory. This is because “peremptory norms prevail not because the states 
involved have so decided but because they are intrinsically superior and can not be 
dispensed with through standard inter-state transactions”172. In other words, peremptory 
norms as opposed to ordinary norms are mandatory and imperative in all circumstances.173 
It has already been shown that the prohibition under the norm on child soldering is binding 
as a compulsory obligation under the CRC, API, APII and ICC statute, whether in internal 
or international armed conflicts.  
Does the norm permit derogation? The derogation referred under Art 53 of the VCLT is a 
derogation made in an attempt to nullify a peremptory norm inter se.174 What is referred is 
any attempt by states to replace public order norms or set down the interests protected and 
to make them inapplicable by agreement among themselves.175 This is evident from the 
merit of the rule on child soldiering and the value that the norm is intended to preserve.  
The values protected by the rule of peremptory norms are not at the disposal of individual 
states.176 Meaning it should be the value that the norm protects what has to be decisive to 
determine the character of the obligation breached. The link the norm has to community 
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interest as opposed to individual interest of state or non-state actors is a factor that should 
be determinative of the norms character.  Therefore the norm intends to benefit a given 
actor in the interest of the community, there can be no valid derogation from the norm and 
states or non-state actors can not split the norm into bilateral legal relations.177  
Such progressive approach in identifying the character of the norm at issue as peremptory 
norm contributes in making states and non-state actors as such accountable for violating the 
obligation that they owe to the international community.                           
     
5.2.5   Intensity of the breach 
The second requirement for the application of chapter III of the draft articles is to examine 
the intensity of the breach involved. Art 40 (2) stipulates that “a breach of such as 
obligation is serious if it involves a gross or systemic failure by the responsible state to 
fulfill the obligation”.  Thus the breach must be gross or systemic for it to be serious 
enough to trigger chapter three applications.   
A breach of an obligation is serious if it reaches a certain order of magnitude but it is not 
intended to imply that any violation of these obligations is not serious or is somehow 
excusable.178  Chapter three is intended to be applied to those breaches which are more 
serious or systemic.179 What must be taken into account is the intensity of the violation and 
its effect and the violation amounting to an assault to the value that is being protected by 
the rule.180  
A breach is systemic if it is carried out in an organized and deliberate way and the scope of 
the violation and the gravity of their consequence for the victims are indicators of the 
systemic nature of the breach.181 Above all the serious breaches that can be applied under 
chapter three of the draft articles are those beaches that are likely to be dealt with the 
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Security Council.182 But when it comes to the SC resolutions discussed above, the 
resolutions did not make specific reference to states and non-state actors that are implicated 
to have violated the rule. At least the series of resolutions on the matter indicates how 
serious the violations are.  
If chapter III of the draft article is applied in such a manner, then states and non-state actors 
will owe the obligation to the international community. This becomes so important in 
increasing the enforceability of the obligation and the accountability of state and non-state 
actors as such. This leads to the second question- what is the consequence of the breach of 
the norm under the draft articles for the states and non-state actors?    
If the norm is taken as forming part of the peremptory norm under chapter III of the draft 
article then the consequence of the breach is what is provided under Art 41 of chapter III of 
the draft article.  
 
5.2.6   Consequences of the breach for states  
Art 41 of the draft articles provides the consequences of a serious breach of the obligation 
under Art 40. It states;  
1. States shall cooperate to bring an end through lawful means any serious breach 
within the meaning if Art 40. 
2. No state shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the 
meaning of Art 40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation. 
3. This article is without prejudice to the other consequences referred to in this part 
and to such further consequences that a breach to which this chapter applies may 
entail under international law.   
Sub Art 1 and 2 prescribe special legal obligation for those states faced with breaches that 
fall under Art 40.183 The special legal obligation include duty to cooperate to bring an end 
to the violation, duty to abstain from recognizing the violation as lawful and duty to abstain 
from rendering aid or assistance that may maintain the violation. Thus according to these 
two sub articles all states are called upon to make appropriate response to the violation. 
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Concerning the duty under sub article 2 it applies even to the state responsible for the 
violation. Meaning the responsible state is also under the obligation not to recognize or 
sustain the unlawful situation arising from the violation.184  
Sub article 3 provides that the violation entails the legal consequences stipulated under 
chapter I and II of part two of the draft articles. Thus beach under Art 40 gives rise to an 
obligation on the responsible state to cease the wrongful act (Art 30(a)), to give guarantee 
and assurance for non-repetition of the violation (Art 30(b)) and to make reparation (Art 
31). The responsible state could be made accountable to make reparation for the injury 
sustained by the wrongful act. The obligation of the norm on child soldering is owed to the 
international community as a whole, thus satisfaction in terms of Art 37(2) may be 
appropriate given the fact that it can not be made good by restitution or compensation as 
Art 35 and 36 respectively provide. Art 37 (2) states that “satisfaction may consist in an 
acknowledgment of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another 
appropriate modality.” These are consequences that should be taken as a means of 
encouraging the state in violation to adhere to its obligation under international law.185  
In addition sub article 3 provides for “…such further consequences that a breach to which 
this chapter applies may entail under international law” This phrase accordingly allows that 
international law may recognize additional legal consequences following from violation 
under Art 40.186 Therefore states that breached the minimum standard on child soldiering 
may be accounted for as per the consequences set out under Art 41 of the draft articles.       
 
5.2.7    Consequences of the breach for non-state actors   
It has been shown that it is mostly non-state actors that are implicated for acting in 
violation of the norm on child soldiering. Even this occurrence has led to the inclusion of 
provisions to criminalize individuals that belong to non-state actors. But there appears to be 
no rule that can make non-state actors as such accountable for violating the norm. The only 
possible circumstance that a non-state actor can be made accountable under the draft 
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articles is if Art 10 can be applied. Art 10 provides that “the conduct of an insurrectional 
movement which becomes the new government of a state shall be considered an act of that 
state under international law”.  This provision will have limited applicability. First the 
provision makes reference to insurrectional movement only. This excludes all the other 
forms of non-state actors. Second the provision will only apply if the insurrectional 
movement becomes successful in becoming a state. Therefore non-state actors, except 
when they become successful in forming a state, can not be accounted for violating the 
norm on child soldiering under the draft articles.  
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6. Conclusion  
It has been shown that the regulation of the international law of child soldiering is taken up 
under different treaty laws. As a result of which different states may be bound by different 
treaty obligations. The prohibition of the conscription and enlistment of children below 15 
years of age into armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities forms what 
now is regarded as the minimum standard on the international law of child soldiering. Thus 
violation of this minimum standard should entail accountability of both states and non-state 
actors under international law.  
The egregious and abhorrent nature of the violation of the rules on child soldering has 
triggered Security Council’s involvement which resulted in series of resolutions. The 
resolutions condemned, identified violators, and established monitoring and reporting 
system and a working group to review reports with the aim of ending the practice. The SC 
has also made threats to take targeted action on violators who are making no progress to 
end the practice. Since the aim of the SC resolution is to end the practice the council should 
be able to convert the threats into actions on the persistent violators that it identified so that 
the aim is fulfilled. 
The violation of the rule on child soldering is intolerable and is a breach of an important 
value of the international community. Thus not only individuals should be criminal 
responsible but also the state and non-state actors as such should be made accountable 
under international law. The violation of such a norm is an internationally wrongful act 
which forms a serious breach of obligation under peremptory norms of general 
international law. Arguably chapter III of the draft articles could be made applicable to 
make a state in breach accountable. But under the draft articles non-state actors, who most 
of the time are implicated for violation, can only be made accountable if they become a 
state. Therefore, the accountability of state and non-state actors as such is a matter that 
triggers concerns if it is possible to enforce the rules with the existing lacuna in the 
international system. 
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